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I. INTRODUCTION 
The problem cannot be overstated. An estimated 19.4% of non-
institutionalized civilians in the United States, or 48.9 million people, 
have a disability.1 Almost half of these people, an estimated 24.1 
million Americans, have a severe disability.2  Of all non-
institutionalized persons age fifteen and over in the United States, 
17.5% (roughly 34.2 million people) are limited in physical functions.3  
These limitations include the ability to walk up a flight of stairs, hear 
what is said in normal conversation, see words or letters in ordinary 
newsprint, or get in and out of bed.4 
In addition, approximately 28.1% of Americans, or 51.3 million 
people, suffer from a diagnosable mental disorder.5 An estimated 2.2 
million American adults suffer from schizophrenia.6 According to the 
National Institute of Mental Health, 90% of people who commit suicide 
have a diagnosable mental disorder.7 An estimated 284,000 inmates are 
identified as having a mental illness, which represents about 16% of the 
inmate populations of state and local jails.8 Lastly, four of the ten 
leading causes of disability in the United States—major depression, 
                                                                                                           
 1 National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research, Access to Disability 
Data: Chartbook on Disability in the U.S., http://www.infouse.com/disabilitydata/ 
disability/1_1.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2006). 
 2 Id. 
 3 National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research, Access to Disability 
Data: Chartbook on Disability in the U.S., http://www.infouse.com/disabilitydata/ 
disability/1_2.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2006). 
 4 Id. 
 5 National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research, Access to Disability 
Data: Chartbook on Disability in the U.S., http://www.infouse.com/disabilitydata/ 
disability/1_5.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2006). 
 6 See National Institute of Mental Health, Mental Disorders in America, 
http://www.intelihealth.com/IH/ihtIH/WSIHW000/8271/8849.html (last visited Mar. 
30, 2006) 
 7 Id. 
 8 See Mental Illness and the Criminal Justice System, http://www.geocities.com/ 
stargazers_here/mental_illness.html?200528 (last visited Mar. 30, 2006). 
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bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and obsessive-compulsive disorder—
are mental illnesses.9 
By 1990, Congress had come to recognize that existing law did 
not deal with this issue adequately. Thus, Congress passed the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)10 to correct the 
“discrimination against individuals with disabilities [that] persists in 
such critical areas as . . . institutionalization, health services . . . and 
access to public services.”11 In conjunction with Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act and the Fair Housing Amendments Act, Congress 
enacted Title II of the ADA to facilitate access to the benefits of public 
services, programs or activities for disabled, including mentally ill, 
Americans who qualify for such services. 
The passage of the ADA was widely lauded. Many commentators 
saw it as an “emancipation proclamation” for people with disabilities.12 
Since its passage, however, courts have limited the scope of the ADA. 
For example, Katie Eyer writes that in University of Alabama v. 
Garrett,13 the Supreme Court found that Title I of the ADA did not 
validly abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states.14 The Court 
upheld Title II of the ADA three years later, in Tennessee v. Lane.15 
However, it did so on an as-applied basis.16 While favorable to 
                                                                                                           
 9 National Institute of Mental Health, supra note 6. 
 10 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213). 
 11 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2000); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 526 
(2004) (stating that “[i]n the deliberations that led up to the enactment of the ADA, 
Congress identified important shortcomings in existing laws that rendered them 
‘inadequate to address the pervasive problems of discrimination that people with 
disabilities are facing.’”) (citation omitted). An example of such discrimination can be 
found in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding the constitutionality of 
state-imposed sterilization of the disabled). Justice Holmes expressed the views of 
society at that time when he wrote that it would be “better for all the world, if instead of 
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their 
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their 
kind.”  Id. 
 12 Katie Eyer, Note, Rehabilitation Act Redux, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 271 
(2005) (quoting Sen. Edward Kennedy). 
 13 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001). 
 14 Eyer, supra note 12, at 271. 
 15 541 U.S. at 533-34. This case has sparked widespread commentary. See, e.g., 
Michael E. Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental Rights, and Voting, 56 ALA. L. REV. 793 
(2005); Eyer, supra note 12; David J. Langeland, Note, Misapplication of Precedent: 
The United States Supreme Court Ignores the Overbreadth of the ADA by Abrogating 
State Sovereignty in Tennessee v. Lane, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1065 (2005); Aaron 
Ponzo, Note, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act Is a Valid Exercise of 
Congress’ Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity: Tennessee v. Lane, 43 DUQ. 
L. REV. 317 (2005). 
 16 Eyer, supra note 12, at 271. 
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individual litigants, Lane’s approach allows for the possibility that 
some applications of Title II will be subject to a successful sovereign 
immunity defense.17 
Most recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit issued a potentially devastating opinion to disabled Americans. 
In Wisconsin Community Service, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, Judge 
Easterbrook ruled that a disabled person seeking “reasonable 
accommodation” does not have a cognizable cause of action under 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or Title II of the ADA.18 The 
Seventh Circuit granted Plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing en banc and 
the full court will determine whether Title II of the ADA includes a 
right to reasonable accommodation.19 
If the en banc court upholds Judge Easterbrook’s decision, the 
implications will be far reaching. In order to recover for a public 
entity’s discrimination in the provision of public services, programs, or 
activities, plaintiffs bringing a claim under Title II of the ADA will be 
forced to argue one of two theories. Plaintiffs can argue intentional 
discrimination, which occurs when a public entity intentionally denies a 
public service or benefit on the basis of disability, or disparate impact, 
which occurs when a public entity applies neutral rules or regulations in 
a manner that adversely affects the disabled differently from the non-
disabled. Simply put, the disabled will have no recourse for a public 
entity’s failure to accommodate their special needs. Thus, for example, 
HIV-positive patients will have no recourse if they cannot take 
advantage of a city’s AIDS program because the city failed to put in 
place certain features they need for access.20 Moreover, a city would be 
under no duty to exempt a group of wheelchair-bound people from its 
zoning rules so that those people could live together in a group home.21 
This outcome would deal a devastating blow to disabled people’s 
quality of life. 
This article reviews Judge Easterbrook’s decision and argues that 
it is contrary to established law. We begin by outlining the overview of 
the case, including the factual background, the district court’s ruling, 
Judge Easterbrook’s decision, and Judge Wood’s dissenting opinion. 
Next, we explain the legislative history behind Congress’s enactment of 
                                                                                                           
 17 Id. 
 18 413 F.3d 642, 648 (7th Cir. 2005), vacated, reh’g granted en banc, No. 04-1966, 
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19033 (7th Cir. Aug. 31, 2005). 
 19 Id. 
 20 See Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 81 F. Supp. 2d 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 21 See, e.g., Dr. Gertrude A. Barber Ctr., Inc., v. Peters Twp., 273 F. Supp. 2d 643 
(W.D. Pa. 2003). 
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Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA. Part IV 
of this article analyzes Judge Easterbrook’s decision in light of the 
legislative history and case law from the Supreme Court, the Seventh 
Circuit, and other circuits that have considered whether Title II 
recognizes a duty to reasonably accommodate qualified disabled 
persons. Finally, we conclude in Part V that Judge Easterbrook’s 
opinion is contrary to established law and urge the Seventh Circuit en 
banc to overturn the Wisconsin Community Service decision. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CASE 
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
The story is typical. Wisconsin Community Service (“WCS”) is a 
private, non-profit organization that operates an outpatient mental 
health clinic in the City of Milwaukee (the “City”).22 Without WCS, 
many of these patients would not receive the necessary health services.  
The vast majority of WCS’s 400 patients are disenfranchised – 
currently in or just released from the criminal justice system and 
suffering from mental illness and/or drug and alcohol problems.23 The 
clinic provides, among other things, “psychiatric treatment, counseling, 
medication monitoring, financial monitoring, housing assistance, 
employment assistance, grocery shopping and transportation services” 
to its clients.24 Most of WCS’s clients live in the area where both the 
present and proposed facilities are located.25 In 1998, WCS decided to 
relocate to a larger facility in order to serve the needs of its expanding 
client base and alleviate the effects of overcrowding.26 Limited space 
posed a serious problem because many clients could not cope with the 
stimuli associated with overcrowding.27 Moreover, WCS relied heavily 
on regular one-on-one sessions between clients and therapists, and the 
lack of space compromised the privacy necessary for effective 
sessions.28 
                                                                                                           
 22 Wisconsin Cmty. Serv., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1098 
(E.D. Wis. 2004), vacated, 413 F.3d 642, 648 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 23 See id.; Wisconsin Community Services, Inc., WCS Program Descriptions, 
http://www.wiscs.org/ProgramDescriptions.aspx?ProgramID=33; 
http://www.wiscs.org/ 
ProgramDescriptions.aspx?ProgramID=9 (last visited Mar. 30, 2006). 
 24 Wisconsin Cmty. Serv. Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1099. 
 25 Id. at 1099-1100. 
 26 Id. at 1098, 1100. 
 27 Id. at 1100. 
 28 Id. 
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After searching for more than three years for an adequate space, 
WCS purchased an 81,000 square foot property approximately one mile 
west of its old location.29 WCS planned to use only 20,000 square feet 
of the property for its clinic and rent out, to commercial and non-
commercial entities, the remaining 61,000 square feet.30 In order to 
operate a health clinic at the newly purchased property, however, the 
City’s zoning laws required WCS to obtain a special use permit, which 
the City denied.31 
WCS appealed the decision to the Board of Zoning Appeals 
(“BOZA”), arguing that it satisfied the City’s four criteria for granting a 
special use permit32 and, alternatively, that the ADA entitled WCS to a 
permit as a reasonable accommodation.33 On May 9, 2001, BOZA 
denied WCS’s request for a special use permit, stating that WCS had 
not met the necessary criteria.34 
On June 6, 2001, WCS filed suit in the district court and the judge 
remanded the case to BOZA to determine whether WCS should be 
granted a special use permit as a reasonable accommodation under the 
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.35 On December 27, 2002, BOZA 
denied WCS’s request, determining that the accommodation was 
neither reasonable nor necessary in this situation.36 WCS appealed the 
denial to federal court once again. 
B. The District Court’s Ruling 
The district court ruled in WCS’s favor, explaining that “the sole 
issue is whether the City discriminated against WCS’s clients on the 
basis of their disability.”37 The court began its analysis by noting that 
WCS could prove discrimination under any one of three theories under 
Title II of the ADA: 1) intentional discrimination; 2) disparate impact; 
or 3) failure to make a reasonable accommodation.38 In granting WCS’s 
motion for summary judgment, the district court addressed only the 
                                                                                                           
 29 Id. at 1098. 
 30 Id. at 1107. Two non-commercial entities, the Social Security Administration and 
the Milwaukee office of the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, leased space in the 
building at the time WCS purchased it. Id. 
 31 Id. at 1098. 
 32 The City’s criteria for obtaining a special use permit were: (1) protection of 
public health, safety and welfare; (2) protection of property; (3) traffic and pedestrian 
safety; and (4) consistency with the City’s comprehensive plan. Id. at 1098 n.3. 
 33 Id. at 1099. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 1101. 
 37 Id. at 1104. 
 38 Id. 
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reasonable accommodation theory because it found that theory to be 
dispositive of the issue in the case. 
The court reasoned that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act 
mirror the Fair Housing Amendments Act (“FHAA”), which requires 
public entities to change neutral rules, policies, practices or services 
when necessary to reasonably accommodate qualified individuals with 
disabilities.39 Although Title II of the ADA does not contain the same 
language as the FHAA, the court recognized that the regulations 
promulgated by the U.S. Department of Justice to implement Title II, 
contain a reasonable accommodation provision.40 Similarly, the 
Rehabilitation Act “requires reasonable accommodation unless it 
creates ‘undue financial or administrative burdens’ or ‘requires a 
fundamental alteration in the nature of the program.’”41 The court found 
that the language from the regulations of the agency entrusted with 
implementing Title II, the Department of Justice, along with similar 
language in the Rehabilitation Act, suggested that both acts imposed a 
duty of reasonable accommodation on public entities. 
Applying Title II’s implementing regulations, the district court 
recognized that the duty to reasonably accommodate does not merely 
require public entities to grant disabled persons the same access to 
public services as non-disabled persons; Title II also protects the special 
needs of disabled individuals.42 Thus, because the special needs of 
disabled individuals are protected, where those needs are not shared by 
the general public “it makes little sense to inquire whether the disabled 
are entitled to equal opportunity to such services.”43 The court then 
conducted a burden-shifting analysis, finding that “in order to prevail, 
WCS must show only that its requested accommodation is reasonable 
and necessary” and “if it makes such a showing, the City must then 
demonstrate unreasonableness or undue hardship in the particular 
circumstances.”44 
                                                                                                           
 39 Id. The FHAA definition of discrimination includes “a refusal to make 
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such 
accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and 
enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2000). 
 40 Wisconsin Cmty. Serv. Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1104. At 28 C.F.R. § 
35.130(b)(7), the implementing regulations provide that “[a] public entity shall make 
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications 
are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity 
can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of 
the service, program or activity.” 
 41 Wisconsin Cmty. Serv. Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1104. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 1105. 
 44 Id. 
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The district court reasoned that “an accommodation is reasonable 
if the benefit that it will provide to the disabled . . . outweighs the cost 
to the public entity to implement it.”45 The court found that the presence 
of a WCS clinic at the new site would not prevent a commercial entity 
from locating there since WCS only intended to use about 25% of the 
space in the building for its clinic.46 Further, two non-commercial 
enterprises, the Social Security Administration and the local office of 
the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, already leased space in the 
building at the time WCS bought it. The court held, therefore, that 
requiring the City to grant WCS a special use permit was 
“reasonable.”47 
Next, the district court determined whether accommodation was 
necessary. To establish this, the court found that “a plaintiff . . . need 
only show that it made a good faith effort to find an alternative to the 
accommodation but was unable to do so.”48 The court held that the 
evidence showed that WCS had made a good faith effort to find a 
suitable property that did not require a special use permit. It also 
rejected the City’s argument that the search might have been more 
successful if it had hired a buyer’s broker.49 Finally, the district court 
found that the City failed to make a showing that granting WCS a 
special use permit would cause undue hardship.50 Consequently, it 
ordered the City to grant WCS a special use permit.51 
C. Judge Easterbrook’s Panel Decision 
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit panel majority, 
overturned the district court decision, holding instead that “[n]either 
Title II of the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, 
contains a general accommodation provision.”52 Conceding that “[a]n 
accommodation requirement has been added to Title II by regulation 
and to the Rehabilitation Act by judicial gloss plus another regulation,” 
Judge Easterbrook nevertheless ruled that “Title II . . . lacks the sort of 
                                                                                                           
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 1106-07. 
 47 Id. at 1107. 
 48 Id. at 1108. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Wisconsin Cmty. Serv., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 413 F.3d 642, 645 (7th Cir. 
2005), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 04-1966, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19033 
(7th Cir. Aug. 31, 2005). 
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accommodation requirement to be found in Title III (or for that matter 
Title I).”53 
Judge Easterbrook reasoned that the FHAA does not require 
municipalities to depart from their zoning codes to reduce the cost at 
which disabled persons can acquire housing or mental-health services.54 
Based on his reading of the FHAA, Judge Easterbrook found that the 
act only imposes a duty of reasonable accommodation on public entities 
where disabled persons are denied the same opportunity as non-disabled 
individuals to obtain housing.55 According to Judge Easterbrook, the 
FHAA assures only “equal opportunity” which means “freedom from 
the adverse effects of local laws and rules that affect disabled persons 
because of that disability, yet do not pose problems for equivalent but 
non-disabled persons.”56 Judge Easterbrook noted that Milwaukee’s 
zoning rules, and its stated criteria for special-use permits, treat mental-
health and dental-health clinics identically.57 Thus, Judge Easterbrook 
reasoned that in the absence of disparate impact there is no need for 
accommodation under the FHAA, and by implication, Title II.58 
Judge Easterbrook also addressed the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in 
Good Shepherd Manor Foundation, Inc. v. City of Momence, where the 
court wrote that “[f]ailure to reasonably accommodate is an alternative 
theory of liability.”59 However, “[t]o say that reasonable 
accommodation is an ‘alternative theory of liability’ is not . . . to say 
that it is a theory independent of both intentional discrimination and 
disparate impact.”60 In other words, Judge Easterbrook ruled that 
reasonable accommodation is a remedy for disparate impact or 
intentional discrimination but it is not a cognizable theory of liability 
under Title II of the ADA.61 Judge Easterbrook conceded, however, that 
                                                                                                           
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 646. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 647. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 646. 
 59 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Good Shepherd Manor Found., Inc. v. 
City of Momence, 323 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
 60 Id. 
 61 According to Judge Easterbrook, WCS would likely be unable to make a 
showing of intentional discrimination or disparate impact because: 
A requirement that imposes equal cost on all persons does not have such a 
disparate impact. Just as everyone (disabled or not) needs housing and 
would prefer to pay less, so everyone (disabled or not) needs medical care 
and would prefer to pay less. If Milwaukee applies the same rules to 
mental-health clinics and dental-health clinics, there is neither 
discrimination nor disparate impact. The statutes do not require a city to be 
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if Title II of the ADA does require the City to make reasonable 
accommodations then granting WCS a special-use permit would be 
reasonable in this case.62 
D. Judge Wood’s Dissent 
In his dissent, Judge Wood found that the regulations 
implementing Title II unambiguously answer the question of whether 
reasonable accommodation constitutes a cognizable theory of liability 
independent of intentional discrimination or disparate impact in the 
affirmative.63 Judge Wood noted that the “regulation says nothing about 
an antecedent need to prove pre-existing intentional discrimination or 
disparate impact” before advancing a theory of reasonable 
accommodation.64 In so finding, Judge Wood cited to the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,65 which required 
reasonable accommodation in the employment discrimination (Title I) 
context, because the language of the Department of Justice’s regulation 
is “substantively identical” to the language at issue in Barnett.66 
Judge Wood explained further that the “problem is that there are 
many services and facilities that are of interest only to disabled people, 
such as the ramps and the audible elevator announcements . . . . In those 
situations, there would never be a way to prove either individual animus 
or disparate impact, unless the latter theory were applied far more 
broadly than it normally is.”67 
Judge Wood concluded that the district court’s decision focused 
on the rules, practices, et cetera, that hurt WCS and its clients because 
of their mental disabilities, as opposed to their lack of money or other 
characteristics that they share with many members of the general 
public.68 Unlike affordable housing, mental health services are uniquely 
important for people with mental disabilities.69 Judge Wood thus found 
that Title II of the ADA imposed on the City an affirmative duty of 
reasonable accommodation, the requested accommodation was 
                                                                                                           
more forgiving when mental health clinics want to bend the rules than 
when dental health clinics make the same request. 
Id. 
 62 Id. at 648. 
 63 Id. at 649 (Wood. J., dissenting). 
 64 Id. at 649. 
 65 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
 66 Wisconsin Cmty. Serv., 413 F.3d at 650 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 651 (citing Hemisphere Bldg. Co. v. Vill. of Richton Park, 171 F.3d 437, 
440 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
 69 Id. 
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reasonable and necessary, and the City should have granted WCS’s 
request for a special use permit.70 
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
As Judge Easterbrook pointed out in his decision, neither the 
Rehabilitation Act nor Title II of the ADA explicitly make reasonable 
accommodation a cause of action.71 Reasonable accommodation, 
therefore, does not exist under a plain reading of the statutes. However, 
the legislative history of the two statutes reveals that Congress 
apparently intended reasonable accommodation to be a cause of action 
under both statutes. 
A. Section 504 
In 1973, Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act, the first federal 
handicap discrimination statute.72 Under Section 504: “No otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, 
solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.”73 Thus, Section 504 bars discrimination against 
disabled persons in the administration of programs conducted by state 
and local government74 and requires that programs or activities operated 
by a federally funded entity be readily accessible to persons with 
disabilities.75 Section 504’s regulations generally require that the 
disabled have equal opportunities to achieve the same benefits as non-
disabled persons. Each federal agency has promulgated regulations for 
                                                                                                           
 70 See id. at 652 (agreeing with the lower court’s holding in Wis. Cmty. Servs., Inc. 
v. City of Milwaukee, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1108 (E.D. Wis. 2004)). 
 71 Id. at 645 (majority opinion). 
 72 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified at 29 
U.S.C. § 701 et seq.).  Although Section 504 was passed in 1973, drafting and 
promulgation of Section 504’s regulations took an exceedingly long time. As a result it 
did not go into effect until 1976 after President Ford had left office. Mark C. Weber, 
Disability Discrimination by State and Local Government: The Relationship Between 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1089, 1093-95 (1995) (tracing history of passage of the 
Rehabilitation Act). 
 73 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). 
 74 28 C.F.R. § 42.520 (2006). 
 75 Id. § 42.521(a). 
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recipients of federal funding under its purview.76 Although there are 
minor differences, the regulations are largely identical.77 
The Supreme Court has recognized that there is a duty to 
reasonably accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act.78 In 
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, a hearing impaired plaintiff 
sued the defendant’s nursing program for discriminating against her by 
not providing the facilities she needed to attend the school.79 The Court 
refused to recognize the discrimination claim, reasoning that Congress 
did not intend Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to include an 
affirmative action requirement.80 Instead, the Court found that Section 
504 protects only those handicapped individuals who are “otherwise 
qualified,” a term which the court interpreted as “able to meet all of a 
program’s requirements in spite of [a] handicap.”81 The Court, however, 
recognized that reasonable accommodation may require an employer to 
alter a program’s requirements because “situations may arise where a 
refusal to modify an existing program might become unreasonable and 
discriminatory.”82 The Davis Court found that there was no duty to 
reasonably accommodate under the facts of that case.83 
Later, in Alexander v. Choate84 and School Board of Nassau 
County v. Arline,85 the Court held that an employer does not have a duty 
to take affirmative action but does have “an affirmative obligation to 
make reasonable accommodation for a handicapped employee.”86 In 
Choate, the Court upheld a Medicaid plan that imposed an annual limit 
on days of Medicaid-covered hospitalization, even though that plan had 
a greater negative impact on persons with disabilities than other 
                                                                                                           
 76 See BONNIE P. TUCKER & BRUCE A. GOLDSTEIN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW, app. B (1991) (listing regulations 
promulgated under § 504). 
 77 Compare 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 (implementing regulations of Title II by DOJ), with 49 
C.F.R. pts. 27, 37, 38 (Titles II and III Department of Transportation), 29 C.F.R. pts. 
1630, 1602 (Title I, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission), and 47 C.F.R. §§ 
64.601-.608 (Title IV, Federal Communications Commission). 
 78 See, e.g., L.D. Clark, Shields v. City of Shreveport: Federal Grantees Under the 
Rehabilitation Act Escape Duty of Reasonable Accommodation Toward Alcoholics, 66 
TUL. L. REV. 603 (1991); Robert B. Fitzpatrick & E. Anne Benaroya, Advanced 
Employment Law and Litigation Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship 
Under the ADA: Selected Issues, C669 ALI-ABA 389 (1991) (discussing the duty of 
reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act). 
 79 442 U.S. 397, 402 (1979). 
 80 Id. at 410-11. 
 81 Id. at 406. 
 82 Id. at 412-13. 
 83 Id. at 413. 
 84 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
 85 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
 86 Id. at 289 n.19. 
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possible Medicaid plans would have had, and lacked a justification to 
make it superior to other forms of budget control with a lesser impact.87 
The Court, however, was careful to distinguish the adverse impact 
in Choate from the adverse impact that created architectural barriers 
and had the affect of discriminating against the disabled in 
transportation, job qualification, and education and recognized that 
Section 504 did reach adverse impacts in these areas. 88 Most 
importantly, the Court clarified the distinction made in Davis between 
reasonable accommodation and affirmative action, holding that Davis 
meant to exclude from the requirements of Section 504 only 
fundamental alterations in programs.89 
B. Title II of the ADA 
Twelve years after Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act, 
President George H.W. Bush signed the ADA into law.90 The purpose 
of the ADA was to establish “a clear and comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities”91 and was to “be broadly construed to effectuate its 
purpose.”92 Title II of the ADA restates Section 504 in its general 
terms: “Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified 
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be 
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity.”93 Title II thus prohibits public 
service entities from discriminating against disabled individuals.94 
                                                                                                           
 87 See Choate, 469 U.S. at 308-09. 
 88 See id. at 296-99. The Court held that § 504 must be kept within manageable 
bounds. 
 89 Id. at 300-01 & n.20. The Court further developed this reasoning in Arline, 480 
U.S. at 287 n.17, which distinguished the affirmative obligation to make reasonable 
accommodations from affirmative action as used in other contexts.  See Jeffrey O. 
Cooper, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: The Trials of Textualism and 
the Practical Limits of Practical Reason, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1231-48 (2000) 
(explaining the difficulties making this distinction). 
 90  “In comparison to the battle fought over the Rehabilitaion Act of 1973 and the 
section 504 regulations, the process that led to title II of the ADA and its regulations 
was easy.”  Weber, supra note 72, at 1095. Section 504 already covered most 
governmental units, and Title II was perceived as merely extending that coverage a 
small degree. Id. 
 91 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000). 
 92 Pathways Psychosocial v. Town of Leonardtown, 133 F. Supp. 2d 772, 780 (D. 
Md. 2001) (internal citations omitted). 
 93 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). The ADA statute defines a “public entity” as “(A) any 
State or local government; (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other 
instrumentality of a State or States or local government.” Id. § 12131(1). The statute, 
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The chief difference between the statutes is that Section 504 
applies to all entities that receive federal financial assistance95 whereas 
Title II covers “any State or local government” or “any department, 
agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or 
States or local government.”96 
Title II’s language, combined with the legislative history of the 
ADA, suggests that Congress intended this prohibition against 
discrimination to cover a broad range of state and local governmental 
actions.97 For example, in the legislative history of Title II, the 
congressional committees held out Choate as the definitive 
interpretation of Section 504 and Title II. 98 Davis, in contrast, was 
never mentioned. Similarly, a few other cases, all sympathetic to the 
claims of persons with disabilities, appear as examples of what 
Congress wanted Title II to accomplish.99 
Title II, however, has clear limits on its application. For example, 
Congress and the regulators adopted the idea that the law would not 
require fundamental alterations in programs before a duty to 
accommodate persons with disabilities arose.100 
Rather than provide greater specificity on employment, program 
accessibility, or other matters, Title II requires that the Attorney 
General promulgate regulations consistent with Section 504’s 
regulations.101 For employment, regulations regarding the accessibility 
of new facilities must be consistent with those developed by the 
                                                                                                           
however, fails to define the phrase “services, programs or activities.” Weber, supra note 
72, at 1100. The term “benefit” includes the “provision of services, financial aid or 
disposition (i.e., treatment, handling, decision, sentencing, confinement, or other 
prescription of conduct).” 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(j) (2006). 
 94 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12133 (2000) (describing the prohibition against 
discrimination in the provision of public services). See also William H. Grogan, The 
Tension Between Local Zoning and the Development of Elderly Housing: Analyzing the 
Use of the Fair Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act to Override 
Zoning Decisions, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. Rev. 317, 334-37 (2000). 
 95 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). 
 96 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (2000). 
 97 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 84 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367 (stating that Title II extends to all state and local governmental 
actions). 
 98 “[I]t is . . . the Committee’s intent that section 202 also be interpreted consistent 
with Alexander v. Choate.”  Id. 
 99 See, e.g., id. at 50, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 473 (citing with approval the 
concurrence in ADAPT v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1203 (3d Cir. 1989), a case that 
approved a separate but equal transportation service for persons with disabilities). 
 100  28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (2006). 
 101 See Weber, supra note 72, at 1117 (“It can be said that Title II’s legislative 
history  is, in reality, a form of subsequent legislative history for Section 504.”). 
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Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in its role coordinating the 
implementation of Section 504 for other federal agencies.102 
The DOJ regulations implementing Title II are, therefore, entitled 
to controlling weight.103 In promulgating these regulations, the DOJ 
interpreted Title II to prohibit a broad range of discrimination by public 
entities.104 The regulations expressly apply to “all services, programs, 
and activities provided or made available by public entities.”105 The 
regulations also state that the statute applies to all state and local 
governmental services, programs and activities and contain a reasonable 
accommodation provision.106 
The implementing regulations are also directly applicable to 
Wisconsin Community Service, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee. In discussing 
when a municipality may be required to make a reasonable 
accommodation under the ADA, the DOJ’s ADA Technical Assistance 
Manual specifically utilizes a municipal zoning ordinance as an 
illustration of when such a requirement may arise, indicating that the 
DOJ interprets the ADA as extending to zoning ordinances and 
decisions.107 
IV. COMMON LAW ANALYSIS 
In addition to the legislative history, an analysis of precedent 
reveals that courts have repeatedly found that reasonable 
                                                                                                           
 102 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b) (2000). 
 103 See, e.g., Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 45 
(2d Cir. 1997); Does 1-5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 1996); Helen L. v. 
DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Because Title II was enacted with broad 
language and directed the Department of Justice to promulgate regulations . . . the 
regulations which the Department of Justice promulgated are entitled to substantial 
deference.”). 
 104 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b) (2006) (listing several categories of activities that 
constitute discrimination by public entities). 
 105 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a) (2006). 
 106 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a) (stating Title II applies to “all services, programs, or 
activities” by public entities). Title II prohibits discrimination in “all services, 
programs, and activities provided or made available by State and local governments or 
any of their instrumentalities or agencies.” 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A (1999); 28 C.F.R. 
§35.130(b)(7) (explaining that Title II, like Title I and Title III, also contains a 
reasonable accommodation provision). 
 107 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, II-3.6100 (1993) (utilizing 
zoning ordinance as example of when municipality required to make reasonable 
modification); see also Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 
300 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying the FHAA to zoning and noting that the 
“requirements for reasonable accommodation under the ADA are the same as those 
under the FHAA”); Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc., v. City of Middletown, 
294 F.3d 35, 45-46 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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accommodation is a cause of action under both the Rehabilitation Act 
and the ADA. 
A. Supreme Court Decisions Imply that There Is a Duty of Reasonable 
Accommodation in Title II of the ADA 
The Supreme Court has implied that Title II of the ADA contains 
an affirmative duty of reasonable accommodation. In Tennessee v. 
Lane,108 for example, the Court discussed the broad scope of Title II. 
The Court recognized that because “failure to accommodate persons 
with disabilities will often have the same practical effect as outright 
exclusion, Congress required the States to take reasonable measures to 
remove architectural and other barriers to [program] accessibility.”109 
Going further, the Court stated that Title II’s “duty to accommodate” 
requires “‘reasonable modifications’ that would not fundamentally alter 
the nature of the service provided, and only when the individual seeking 
modification is otherwise eligible for the service.”110 
Joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, Justice Ginsburg noted in a 
concurring opinion that: “Including individuals with disabilities among 
people who count in composing ‘We the People,’ Congress understood 
in shaping the ADA, would sometimes require not blindfolded equality, 
but responsiveness to difference; not indifference, but 
accommodation.”111 Justice Ginsburg stated that in Olmstead v. 
Zimring, the Court “responded with fidelity to the ADA’s 
accommodation theme.”112 Justice Ginsburg explained that: “Congress, 
the Court [has] observed, advanced in the ADA ‘a more comprehensive 
view of the concept of discrimination,’ one that embraced failures to 
provide ‘reasonable accommodations.’ The Court [in Lane] is similarly 
faithful to the Act’s demand for reasonable accommodation to secure 
access and avoid exclusion.”113 
In Olmstead, the Court analyzed Title II’s reasonable 
accommodation requirement in the context of the deinstitutionalization 
of mentally ill individuals. The Court held that Title II of the ADA is 
meant to be consistent with § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which 
provides for reasonable accommodation unless “the accommodation 
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program.”114 
                                                                                                           
 108 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
 109 Id. at 531. 
 110 Id. at 532. 
 111 Id. at 536 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 112 Id. at 537. 
 113 Id. (quoting Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 598 (1999), which rejected the 
Eleventh Circuit’s strict construction of the reasonable modification requirement). 
 114 527 U.S. at 606 n.16 (citation omitted). 
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Although the Court required a balancing of the reasonableness of the 
requested accommodation with the City’s available resources, it 
recognized that an affirmative duty of accommodation existed in Title 
II.115 
In U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,116 the Supreme Court ruled that 
the reasonable accommodation requirement of the ADA imposes an 
affirmative duty on public entities to waive a rule that would not be 
waived for a non-disabled individual. Although Barnett involved a 
claim of employment discrimination under Title I of the ADA, the 
Court found the language in Title I to be nearly identical to the 
language in Title II. The Court explained that: 
The Act requires preferences in the form of ‘reasonable 
accommodations’ that are needed for those with disabilities to 
obtain the same . . . opportunities that those without disabilities 
automatically enjoy. By definition any special ‘accommodation’ 
requires the [entity] to treat [individuals] with a disability 
differently, i.e., preferentially. And the fact that the difference 
in treatment violates an [entity’s] disability-neutral rule cannot 
by itself place the accommodation beyond the Act’s potential 
reach.117 
The Supreme Court, therefore, implicitly acknowledged that Title II of 
the ADA contains a duty to reasonably accommodate the needs of the 
disabled. 
B. Other Courts Have Also Recognized that Title II of the ADA Includes 
the Failure to Reasonably Accommodate as a Theory of Recovery 
In McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n,118 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit outlined its 
analysis for Title II claims. In comparing Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA, the court noted that “[i]t is 
well-established that the two statutes are quite similar in purpose and 
scope” and since “the standards under both of the acts are largely the 
same, cases construing one statute are instructive in construing the 
other.”119 
                                                                                                           
 115 See Ellen M. Weber, Bridging the Barriers: Public Health Strategies for 
Expanding Drug Treatment in Communities, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 631, 684 n. 224 
(2005) (citing Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605-07). 
 116 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
 117 Id. at 397-98. 
 118 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 119 Id. at 459-60. (citations omitted). 
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With respect to whether the requirements of Title I and Title III 
apply to Title II of the ADA, the court stated that “most of the law that 
has been made in ADA cases has arisen in the context of employment 
discrimination claims, but we have no doubt that the decisional 
principles of these cases may be applied to this [Title II] case.”120 The 
court held that “there are two methods that would allow the plaintiff[s] 
to demonstrate that . . . actions were taken because of [their] disability: 
either (1) by offering evidence that . . . disabilities were actually 
considered . . . in formulating or implementing the . . . rule, or (2) by 
showing that the [entity] could have reasonably accommodated [the 
plaintiffs’] disability, but refused to do so.”121 Although the court found 
the requested accommodation to be unreasonable in that case, it 
nevertheless ruled that lack of reasonable accommodation was a 
cognizable theory of recovery under Title II of the ADA. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has 
employed a similar analysis for Title II claims. In Regional Economic 
Community Action Program, Inc., v. City of Middletown, for example, 
the court held that the FHA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA all 
apply to zoning decisions.122 Moreover, the court stated that 
“[p]laintiffs who allege violations under the ADA, the FHA, and the 
Rehabilitation Act may proceed under any or all of three theories: 
disparate treatment, disparate impact, and failure to make reasonable 
accommodation.”123 
Furthermore, in Pathways Psychosocial v. Town of 
Leonardtown124 a mental health clinic argued that the town’s denial of 
an occupancy permit constituted unlawful discrimination under the 
ADA. The court found that “the ADA must be broadly construed to 
effectuate its purpose”125 and recognized four different theories of 
recovery “under the ADA: 1) intentional discrimination; 2) disparate 
impact resulting from a facially neutral policy; 3) failure to provide a 
                                                                                                           
 120 Id. at 460. 
 121 Id.; see also Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901, 
910 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that “Title II demands that, in certain instances, public 
entities take affirmative actions to provide qualified disabled individuals with access to 
public services.”). 
 122 294 F.3d 35, 45-46 (2d Cir. 2002); see, e.g., Nevels v. W. World Ins. Co., 359 F. 
Supp. 2d 1110, 1120-21 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Dr. Gertrude A. Barber Ctr., Inc., v. Peters 
Twp., 273 F. Supp. 2d 643, 652 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (applying the reasonable 
accommodation provision of the FHA to zoning decisions). 
 123 294 F.3d at 48; see also Powell v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Examiners, 364 F.3d 79 (2d 
Cir. 2004); Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 124 133 F. Supp. 2d 772 (D. Md. 2001). 
 125 Id. at 780 (citing Civic Ass’n of Deaf of New York City v. Giuliani, 915 F. Supp. 
622, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). 
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reasonable accommodation; and 4) impermissible segregation of mental 
health services for people with mental illness.”126 The court ruled that 
“based on the plain language of the [Department of Justice’s] regulation 
as well as precedent, the proper standard for determining a reasonable 
accommodation is to first inquire whether it is 1) reasonable and 2) 
necessary.”127 
C. Seventh Circuit Case Law 
In Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of 
Milwaukee,128 the Seventh Circuit compared the requirements of the 
FHAA to those imposed by Title II of the ADA. The court noted that 
“[l]ike the FHAA, the ADA ‘provide[s] a clear and comprehensive 
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.’”129 The court in Oconomowoc found that 
the “requirements for reasonable accommodation under the ADA are 
the same as those under the FHAA.”130 The court stated that under both 
the FHAA and the ADA, “a public entity must reasonably 
accommodate a qualified individual with a disability by making 
changes in rules, policies, practices, or services when needed.”131 
Moreover, the “term ‘reasonable accommodation’ in the FHAA is often 
interpreted by analogy with the same phrase in the Rehabilitation Act” 
and “the definition of ‘reasonable accommodation’ in the Rehabilitation 
Act is the same as that in the ADA.”132 
The Seventh Circuit in Oconomowoc held that the FHAA, and by 
implication the ADA, “requires accommodation if such accommodation 
(1) is reasonable, and (2) necessary, (3) to afford a handicapped person 
the equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.”133 The court held 
that an “accommodation is reasonable if it is both efficacious and 
proportional to the costs to implement it.”134 An accommodation is 
necessary, according to the Seventh Circuit, if “the desired 
accommodation will affirmatively enhance a disabled plaintiff’s quality 
                                                                                                           
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 789; see also Behavioral Health Servs., Inc. v. City of Gardena, 2003 WL 
21750852 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2003); Buchanan v. Maine, 366 F. Supp. 2d. 169 (D. Me. 
2005) (recognizing a Title II reasonable accommodation claim). 
 128 300 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 129 Id. at 782 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)). 
 130 Id. at 783. 
 131 Id. at 782-83 (emphasis added). 
 132 Id. at 783 (internal citations omitted). 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 784. 
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of life by ameliorating the effects of the disability.”135 Once the 
plaintiffs show that the accommodation they seek is reasonable, the 
“defendant must come forward to demonstrate unreasonableness or 
undue hardship in the particular circumstances.”136 
The Seventh Circuit noted the similarities between Title II of the 
ADA and the FHAA again in Dadian v. Village of Wilmette.137 
According to the court in Dadian, the “overall focus should be on 
whether waiver of the rule in the particular case at hand would be so at 
odds with the purposes behind the rule that it would be a fundamental 
and unreasonable change.”138 The court concluded that “the methods of 
proving discrimination under Titles I and III should also apply to Title 
II.”139 
In Washington v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n, the Seventh 
Circuit noted that “this and other circuits interpret § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA as coextensive.”140 The court 
ruled that: 
In our view, the Sixth Circuit outlined correctly . . . the various 
methods of proof in § 504 Rehabilitation Act or Title II ADA 
claims: discrimination under both acts may be established by 
evidence that (1) the defendant intentionally acted on the basis 
of the disability, (2) the defendant refused to provide a 
reasonable modification, or (3) the defendant’s rule 
disproportionately impacts disabled people.141 
The Seventh Circuit held that “it is possible to demonstrate 
discrimination on the basis of disability by a defendant’s refusal to 
make a reasonable accommodation.”142 
In Hemisphere Building Co., Inc., v. Village of Richton Park,143 
the Seventh Circuit analyzed a claim for reasonable accommodation 
under the FHAA. The court held that the “duty of reasonable 
accommodation [applies] . . . to rules, policies, etc. that hurt 
handicapped people by reason of their handicap, rather than that hurt 
them solely by virtue of what they have in common with other people, 
such as a limited amount of money to spend on housing.”144 
                                                                                                           
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 783. 
 137 269 F.3d 831, 837 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 138 Id. at 838-39 (internal quotations omitted). 
 139 Id. at 841 (internal citations omitted). 
 140 181 F.3d 840, 846 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 141 Id. at 847. 
 142 Id. at 848. 
 143 171 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 144 Id. at 440. 
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Lastly, in Good Shepherd Manor Foundation, Inc., v. City of 
Momence, the plaintiff sought relief for alleged discrimination under 
the FHAA and the ADA under the theories of “discriminatory intent 
and impact and under a theory that the city failed to provide reasonable 
accommodations.”145 The court held that “the requirements for showing 
failure to reasonably accommodate are the same under the ADA and the 
FHAA.”146 The court provided the following example of how a 
reasonable accommodation claim works: 
[I]f a city required all houses to have narrow doorways, and the 
city failed to waive this requirement, this might harm people in 
wheelchairs by reason of the fact that they are in wheelchairs . . 
. . Th[e] requirement to reasonably accommodate would exist 
regardless of the motivation behind the narrow-doorway rule . . 
. . The error in the city’s logic is all the more clear when we 
consider that reasonable accommodation is . . . an alternative 
theory of liability.147 
D. Critique of Judge Easterbrook’s Reasoning 
We contend that Judge Easterbrook’s reading of the relevant 
statutory texts is flawed. To start, where a statute such as the ADA is to 
be broadly construed, “textualism does not provide the tools necessary 
to arrive at the deterministic conclusion that textualists desire.”148  This 
is because the statute will often contain ambiguities that force a 
textualist to go outside the confines of the act. For example, Judge 
Easterbrook limits the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Good Shepherd by 
finding that the FHAA’s reasonable accommodation provision applies 
only when a showing of disparate impact has been made. Yet the texts 
of the FHAA, the Rehabilitation Act and Titles I and III of the ADA do 
not articulate an antecedent need to show disparate impact. Nor do they 
suggest that reasonable accommodation is merely a remedy for 
disparate impact, rather than an independent theory of recovery. Only 
by looking outside the text could Judge Easterbrook have found that a 
claimant must prove disparate impact or intentional discrimination 
before the reasonable accommodation provision applies. 
Next, although Title II does not contain a reasonable 
accommodation provision, it does direct the Attorney General to enact 
regulations to resolve any ambiguities contained in its text. The DOJ’s 
                                                                                                           
 145 323 F.3d 557, 560 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 146 Id. at 561. 
 147 Id. at 561-62. 
 148 Cooper, supra note 89, at 1255. 
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regulations unambiguously recognize a cause of action for failure to 
provide reasonable accommodations wholly separate from a claim of 
intentional discrimination or disparate impact.149 The text of Title II, 
therefore, which calls on the DOJ to clarify its meaning, imposes a duty 
of reasonable accommodation on public entities. 
Going further, even if Judge Easterbrook’s contention that the 
ADA requires merely equal access to public services for disabled 
individuals is correct, an affirmative duty of reasonable accommodation 
would be the only way to ensure equal access for WCS’s clientele. 
Every individual, for instance, needs dental health services, regardless 
of whether he or she is disabled. A denial of a special use permit to a 
dental health facility, therefore, could not be based on any disability of 
the facility’s clientele because all of the facility’s clientele, disabled and 
non-disabled alike, would be denied access to the services it provides 
by the decision to deny a permit. 
Disabled individuals, however, need reasonable accommodations 
to access certain services precisely because they are disabled. For 
example, only the mentally ill need the services of a mental health 
clinic. Denying a special use permit to a mental health clinic, therefore, 
would only affect the mentally ill’s ability to gain access to necessary 
health services. Because the services provided by WCS are intended for 
the sole benefit of the mentally ill, there is no comparable group of non-
disabled people with whom to place the mentally ill on equal footing. 
In addition, building owners are required to build ramps to allow 
wheelchair-bound people to gain access to the services provided inside 
the building, such as dental health services, which presumably both 
disabled and non-disabled people need. The ramp ensures equal access 
to the building for both disabled and non-disabled individuals because 
both groups require the services provided inside the building. But since 
only the mentally ill require mental health services, comparing dental 
health clinics to mental health clinics is like comparing apples to 
oranges. 
Title II’s duty of reasonable accommodation is meant to cover 
precisely this situation. BOZA could not deny WCS a permit because 
WCS’s clients are mentally ill. That would constitute intentional 
discrimination. Moreover, if WCS could show that the City’s neutral 
zoning rules have a disparate impact on its clients as compared to non-
disabled people because of their mental illnesses,150 it could properly 
                                                                                                           
 149 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). 
 150 Since denial of a dental health permit would still leave people with plenty of 
other options to obtain dental health care in the City whereas WCS is one of the only 
providers of mental health treatment to non-institutionalized individuals, the denial of 
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state a claim of disparate impact under the ADA. Reasonable 
accommodation, however, is a theory of recovery wholly separate from 
disparate impact because it applies to situations where there is no group 
of non-disabled people to measure the affects of a neutral rule or 
procedure against. As Judge Wood noted in his dissenting opinion, 
Judge Easterbrook’s approach “risks having the unfortunate effect of 
barring the disabled from relief just when they need it most: when a 
public entity is failing to provide a service that only the disabled would 
need, under circumstances where intentional discrimination and 
disparate impact would be impossible to prove as a practical matter.”151 
Since a showing of “reasonableness” and “necessity” is fairly easy 
to make, reasonable accommodation shifts the burden to the City to 
show why accommodating the request of WCS would be an undue 
hardship, i.e., financial, violates their plan for the area, et cetera. The 
City maintains the authority to deny the permit, but it must show why 
the accommodation request is unreasonable in order to do so, instead of 
basing its decision solely on the determination that WCS failed to meet 
the City’s zoning criteria for obtaining a permit. 
Judge Easterbrook’s decision, therefore, is problematic because it 
eliminates the one avenue of recovery that those in need of special 
services have to pursue their claims. WCS, for example, could not show 
intentional discrimination because the City’s zoning rules are facially 
neutral. Moreover, it would be extremely difficult for WCS to make a 
showing of disparate impact because only the mentally ill require 
mental health treatment. Thus there is no comparable class or group of 
non-disabled persons against whom to compare the affects of the City’s 
neutral zoning rules. Only under a theory of failure to provide a 
reasonable accommodation could WCS show that the City’s denial of a 
special use permit was unreasonable under the facts of this case. 
Without the right to pursue a reasonable accommodation claim, WCS’s 
clientele are effectively denied access to any non-institutionalized 
mental health treatment in the City of Milwaukee.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The plain language of the FHAA and Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act imposes an affirmative duty of reasonable 
accommodation on public entities. Likewise, Title I and Title III of the 
ADA recognize reasonable accommodation as a theory of recovery in 
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health care. 
 151 Wisconsin Cmty. Serv., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 413 F.3d 642, 651 (Wood, J., 
dissenting). 
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the contexts of employment and public accommodations discrimination. 
The Department of Justice’s regulations, which implement Title II, 
unambiguously extend the affirmative duty of accommodation to public 
entities in the context of zoning. 
Moreover, the case law interpreting Title II, from the Supreme 
Court, to the courts of other circuits, to the Seventh Circuit’s own 
rulings in Oconomowoc, Dadian, Washington, and Good Shepherd, 
supports claims for a public entity’s failure to provide reasonable 
accommodations to otherwise qualified disabled individuals. Judge 
Easterbrook’s decision, therefore, goes against precedent, legislative 
history and the implementing regulations of Title II. 
However, Judge Easterbrook’s analysis is not without basis. Judge 
Easterbrook arrived at his decision through the widely accepted 
textualist method of statutory interpretation. As one commentator 
noted, the “textualist judge approaches this mechanistic process by 
consulting the statutory text, related statutory provisions, and 
standardized external sources . . . such that the judge might consistently 
arrive at an interpretation that reasonably fulfills the commands of the 
text.”152 As Judge Easterbrook explained, although Title I and Title III 
of the ADA (which address discrimination in employment and public 
accommodations) contain explicit reasonable accommodation 
provisions, Title II of the ADA contains no such language. The text of 
Title II, therefore, does not impose a duty of reasonable accommodation 
on public entities. 
Moreover, other courts have supported Judge Easterbrook’s 
finding that Title II does not require public entities to meet the special 
needs of disabled individuals. The Second Circuit, for example, has 
held that the ADA requires merely “evenhanded treatment” in relation 
to non-disabled people rather than the provision of additional benefits 
to the disabled.153 Judge Easterbrook notes that Milwaukee requires all 
health clinics, whether they provide services to the general public or 
services geared specifically towards disabled individuals, to obtain a 
special use permit in the area where WCS’s proposed facility is located. 
Under this view, since the City’s zoning ordinance applies equally to 
clinics serving the disabled and the non-disabled, the City is under no 
duty to “bend the rules” for a mental health service provider like WCS 
simply because its clientele are considered disabled under the ADA. 
                                                                                                           
 152 Cooper, supra note 89, at 1211-12. 
 153 See Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted); 
see also Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 81 F. Supp. 2d 425, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing 
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Moreover, a lack of financial resources affects both disabled and 
non-disabled people alike. In Hemisphere Building, for example, the 
Seventh Circuit held that a public entity was under no duty to grant a 
special use permit to a developer in order to make the wheelchair-
accessible homes he planned to build more affordable for the disabled 
because a limited amount of money is something disabled people have 
in common with non-disabled people.154 Therefore, the developer’s 
potential customers were not entitled to a reasonable accommodation in 
Hemisphere Building because non-disabled people’s housing options 
are also limited by a lack of financial resources.155 
Finally, Judge Easterbrook’s contention that reasonable 
accommodation is merely a remedy for a claim of disparate impact 
instead of an independent cause of action is not without merit. In Good 
Shepherd, for example, the Seventh Circuit ruled that “reasonable 
accommodation is a theory of liability separate from intentional 
discrimination” so that plaintiffs could make a claim under the ADA 
even where a city’s actions were not motivated by a discriminatory 
animus.156 This ruling could be construed as merely recognizing a 
disparate impact claim, which applies where neutral rules, unmotivated 
by discriminatory intent, nevertheless harm disabled individuals more 
than non-disabled individuals by reason of their disability. In Judge 
Easterbrook’s view, the remedy for disabled individuals disparately 
impacted by the facially neutral rules of a public entity is reasonable 
accommodation. Proof of disparate impact is thus necessary before a 
public entity must provide a reasonable accommodation. 
There is, therefore, a real danger that the Seventh Circuit sitting en 
banc will affirm Judge Easterbrook. If it does there would be a split in 
the circuit courts and the case will eventually make its way to the 
Supreme Court. Given the current structure of the court, the Court may 
side with Judge Easterbrook. 
In anticipation of this outcome, it is essential that attorneys 
arguing for reasonable accommodation lay out proper and strong legal 
reasoning. We hope that this article helps in this endeavor. 
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